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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
During the past term, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed five decisions' brought under the federal securities
laws.2 Of these five decisions, Utah State University of Agricul-
ture and Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns & Co. was the most
important.3 The following comment will focus exclusively on the
Utah State University decision.
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF EXCHANGE,
ASSOCIATION, AND FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD RULES
In Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Science
v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,' the plaintiff-University brought eight
companion appeals from judgments dismissing actions against
various brokerage houses for losses sustained in certain securities
transactions. 5 In the district court, the plaintiff had presented
I Pollution Control & Eng'r Corp. v. Lange, No. 76-1338 (10th Cir., July 11, 1977)
(Not for Routine Publication) (a discussion of the elements of section 10(b)); Chandler
v. Kew, Inc., No. 76-1083 (10th Cir., April 19, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication)
("economic reality" of the sale of all the stock was a sale of a business not a security);
SEC v. American Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976) (naked commod-
ity options are securities but are governed by the CFTC); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller
and Danneberg Explor., Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965
(1977) (fractional oil and gas interests offered in their entirety are not securities).
I See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-jj (1970).
549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 264 (1977).
Id.
' Utah State University (USU) is a land grant university operating under the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah. The defendants in the lower court suits were (1) Bear, Stearns
& Co., (2) Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., (3) Bosworth, Sullivan & Co., (4) Hornblower &
Weeks - Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., (5) Shearson, Hammil & Co., (6) Sutro & Co., (7) Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. All of these brokerage firms were members of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). In 1972, the governors of USU
adopted a resolution allowing USU to maintain brokerage accounts, with two named
officers to act thereunder by resolution. The resolution was to remain in effect until notice
of termination was delivered to the brokers. During the subsequent year, Catron, one of
the named officers, opened various accounts. The assistant attorney general of Utah
declared that some of Catron's securities transactions were illegal. USU ordered Catron
to stop purchasing securities. Catron did not stop until four months later when USU sent
notice of revocation of Catron's authority to the brokerage firms. USU filed suit against
the brokers to recover its losses. Id. at 165-67.
It must be emphasized at the outset, that the rules and statutes, as analyzed in this
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three alternative arguments in support of recovery: (1) Violations
of rules 405 and 411 of the New York' (NYSE) and American
Stock (AMEX) Exchanges,' and violations of the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice;" (2)
violations of Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board;9 and, (3)
violation of section 10(b),10 the antifraud provision of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.11 The district court dismissed the first
and second claims on the grounds that no implied private right
of action existed for violation of such rules. The court also found
that the plaintiff failed to support his section 10(b) claim." On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, al-
though it rejected the district court's position that violation of
exchange and association rules never gives rise to a private cause
of action.
comment, are those that were effective during the period under examination. No attempt
is made to analyze the impact of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). The impact of the Act on the area of SEC supervision of exchange
and association promulgation of rules is expected to be far-reaching. See Castruccio &
Tischler, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation-1975, 31 Bus. LAw. 1855, 1884-
85 (1976); Rowen, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975: A Legislative History, 3 Sac.
RFG. L.J. 329 (1976). The Supreme Court's mode of analysis should remain the same,
however, whether one is looking at implied private rights of action before or after the 1975
Act.
, Rule 405 provides, "Every member organization is required . . . to (1) Use due
diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or
margin account . . . and every person holding power of attorney over any account ac-
cepted or carried. ... Rule 405, reprinted in [1973] 2 N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUmE (CCH)
1 2405.
7 Rule 411 is the American Stock Exchange's equivalent to NYSE Rule 405. See
(1973] 2 Am. -STOCK EXCH. GUIDE (CCH) 9431.
Article Ill, Section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice requires that:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any secu-
rity, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recom-
mendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his
financial situation and needs.
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. l, § 2, [1976] NASD MANuA (CCH) 2152.
1 Regulation T concerns the extension of credit by brokers and dealers to their cus-
tomers. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-130 (1977). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970), regulation
X was also promulgated. See 12 C.F.R. § 224.1-.6 (1977). Regulation X makes it illegal
for a customer to obtain, receive, or enjoy credit in violation of Federal Reserve Board
Regulations. Id. § 224.1.
, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
The plaintiff's complaint also alleged various pendent claims under state laws, but
no questions were raised on appeal concerning these matters. 549 F.2d at 166-67.
,2 549 F.2d at 167.
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This comment will examine two rather disturbing aspects of
the Utah State University decision. First, the court appears to
have confused the very subtle but basic distinction between the
concepts of creating an implied private right of action and defin-
ing or identifying the elements of that action. Second, the method
of analysis employed by the court in its examination of the
"Know Your Customer"'" and "Suitability"' 4 rules is so notice-
ably dissimilar from the analytical framework employed by the
Supreme Court in recent securities law opinions that the prece-
dential value of Utah State University is highly suspect.
This comment will focus on these two questions and will
discuss the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the section 10(b) question
only with respect to its impact on the court's analysis of the
exchange and association rules. To adequately understand the
analytical framework in the Utah State University decision, one
must examine the divergent lines of the development case law.
I. NYSE, AMEX, AND NASD RULES: IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF
ACTION
The issue of whether violations of exchange and association
rules give rise to an implied private right of action is a relatively
recent concern. 15 The federal courts have come to differing, often
opposite, conclusions during this issue's short eleven-year his-
" "Know Your Customer" has become the accepted title of rule 405 of the NYSE and
rule 411 of the AMEX, supra notes 6 and 7. For a discussion of these rules see Hoblin,
Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered
Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 253 (1970); MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Viola-
tion of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DEN. L.J. 63 (1970); Wolfson and Russo, The Stock
Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CAL. L. REv. 1120
(1970); Comment, The "Know Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-
Dealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489.
" The "Suitability rule" has become a shorthand phrase for Art. Il, § 2 of the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice. See note 8 supra. For a general discussion of the rule see
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DUKE L.J. 445; Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD
Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. R~v. 15 (1969); Note, Implied Civil Liability Arising From
Violation of the Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rev.
151 (1975); Comment, Civil Liability for Violations of NASD Rules, SEC v. First Securi-
ties Co., 121 U. PA. L. REv. 388 (1973).
, The development of this issue began with the decision of Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). In Colonial Realty,
Judge Friendly traced the development in earlier decisions of a related question, implied
civil liability of a stock exchange for failure to enforce rules adopted pursuant to section
6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 181.
1978
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tory.' Although the courts have applied or developed many dif-
ferent "legal tests" to apply to the facts before them, all of these
tests appear to be variations on, or hybrids of, two decisions of
the late 1960's.
The first test was formulated by Judge Friendly in the 1966
decision, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. In Colonial
Realty, 7 the plaintiff urged that violations of Article III, section
1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice 8 afforded an investor an
implied private right of action. The court qualified its rejection
of the plaintiff's argument by noting:
[Wihether the courts are to imply federal civil liability for violation
of exchange or dealer . . . rules . . . cannot be determined on the
simplistic all-or-nothing basis .... [T]he court must look to the
nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme
.* . . The case for implication would be strongest when the rule
imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law. The rules
here at issue, however, are near the opposite pole."9
" The federal courts have split on the issue of whether exchange and association rules
may give rise to an implied private right of action. For a discussion of why such an action
has been rejected see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1977);
Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975); Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411,
418-20 (D. Minn. 1977); Parsons v. Horblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes [1976-19771
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,885, at 91,249-50 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 1977); Zagari v. Dean
Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,809-13 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 1976); Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 889-90 (D.
Conn. 1976); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-19751 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,021, at 97,581-82 (S.D.N.Y. March 11, 1975); Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., [1974-
1975] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,812 at 96,715 (D. Utah Oct. 1, 1974); Golob v.
Nauman Vandervoort, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
For decisions recognizing that violations of exchange or association rules may give rise
to a private cause of action, see Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160
(8th Cir. 1977); Lincoln Commodity Services v. Meade, 558 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1977);
Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir. 1974); Faturik v. Woodmere
Securities, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 894, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon
& Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Evans v. Kerbes & Co., 411 F. Supp.
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); NYSE v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
These cases represent only a limited survey of the judicial responses to the implied
private right of action issue. See notes 13 and 14 supra for a discussion of these general
concepts.
" 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
, Id. at 180. This section of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides that "A
member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade." NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. m, § 1,
NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2151 (1973).
,1 358 F.2d at 182.
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Judge Friendly reached this conclusion by an analysis of certain
factors which had been developed in past cases examining the
potential existence of an implied private right: (1) whether an
explicit condemnation of certain conduct existed, (2) whether a
general grant of jurisdiction to enforce the liabilities created by
the statute could be found, (3) whether a duty to effectuate the
federal policies of the Act were present, and (4) whether existing
judicial and administrative remedies to effectuate those policies
had proven ineffective. 0 Superimposed upon this analytical
framework was Judge Friendly's additional concern for the poten-
tial impact that the recognition of implied civil liability might




The second bellweather test was formulated by Judge Cum-
mings in 1969, in Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 22Purporting to apply the Colonial Realty test 2i to the
question of whether violations of the "Know Your Customer" rule
gave rise to an implied private right of action, Judge Cummings,
in effect, fashioned a new two-element test, requiring considera-
tion only of whether the particular rule in question "was designed
for the direct protection of investors," and whether the particular
defendant's conduct had been "tantamount to fraud. 2 Qualify-
ing this test by noting that a violation of the "Know Your Cus-
Id. at 181. The court found these factors to have been decisive in J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d
Cir. 1951), and Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944), (all dealing with implied private rights of action under various provisions of
the federal securities laws).
" See 358 F.2d at 182-83. The self-regulatory nature of exchanges and associations
was amply supported by the recent congressional statement that "[tihe self-regulatory
roles of the exchanges and the NASD have been major elements of the regulatory scheme
of the Exchange Act since 1934 and 1938, respectively." SECURIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF
1975, S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 179, 201. See also REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE
SECURImES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95 Pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
In Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 349-61 (1963), the Supreme Court went to some lengths
to discuss the self-regulatory scheme devised by Congress.
410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
2 Id. at 142. Judge Cummings quoted the specific language of the Colonial Realty
opinion that may be found in the text accompanying note 19 supra. In addition, Judge
Cummings noted that "[sluch a breach of fair practice undermines the protection of
investors and surely 'play[s] an integral part in SEC regulation' of Exchanges and their
members. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. (citation omitted)."
2' Id. at 142-43.
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tomer" rule was not per se actionable, Judge Cummings believed
that the conduct before him was sufficient to give rise to an im-
plied private right of action. 5
As noted earlier, the federal courts have split, both in the
results they have reached on this issue and in the "legal test" they
have applied.26 The courts within the Tenth Circuit have fared no
better in their analysis of the problem.
The first federal court within the Tenth Circuit to address
the issue of whether violations of exchange and association rules
give rise to an implied private right of action was the tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals itself in Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co. 7 In
dictum, Judge Seth cited the Buttrey decision with approval, and
noted: "[W]hile we recognize that in an appropriate case, viola-
tions of exchange rules designed for customer protection might
give rise to a private cause of action . . . such a case is not now
before us."2 Without mentioning the second "tantamount to
fraud" element of the Buttrey test, or the reason for the court's
adoption of the Buttrey test over the Colonial Realty test, the
court resolved the case on traditional agency law principles."
One month after Ocrant, in October of 1974, the Utah Fed-
eral District Court rejected an implied private right of action for
violation of the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules.
Without any mention of Ocrant, Judge Anderson, writing for the
court in Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc.,-3 relied solely on Judge
Friendly's analytical framework in Colonial Realty.3' The court,
Id. at 142. It is interesting to note that what may have been envisioned as merely
a variation of the Colonial Realty test in the Buttrey decision has come to be viewed as a
separate and totally distinct test. See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 164-66 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 418-19 (1977), Zagari
v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,807-09 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 1976). See also, Hoblin, supra note 13, at 258-66; MacLean, supra note 13,
at 66-71; Wolfson and Russo, supra note 13, at 1126-33.
0 See notes 13-16, 25 supra.
" 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974).
n Id. at 858.
0 See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Subsequently Ocrant has been cited for
the proposition that the violation of certain exchange rules may give rise to an implied
private right of action. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. at
1040; Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Zagari v. Dean Witter
& Co., [1976-19771 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,808.
[1974-19751 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,812 (D. Utah, Oct. 1, 1974).
31 Id. at 96,714-15. The plaintiff alleged violations of Art. m, §§ 1, 2 of the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, rule 405 of the NYSE, and rule 411 of AMEX. It is interesting to
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only briefly adverting to the Seventh Circuit (Buttrey) rule, re-
jected the Buttrey test and adopted Colonial Realty on the
grounds that the latter better differentiated between mere ethical
standards of professional service and rules designed to prevent
fraud.
32
This rejection was followed, in time, by the Wyoming Dis-
trict Court's recognition of an implied private right of action for
violation of the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules
in Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson, and Curtis, Inc.31 In contrast
to State of Utah, Judge Kerr, in Geyer, relied almost exclusively
upon the Ocrant and Buttrey decisions.34 Citing Mercury Invest-
ment Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Judge Kerr distinguished
Colonial Realty on the grounds that that decision involved a vio-
lation of Article III, section 1 of the NASD rules rather than rule
405. In a perceptive analysis of Colonial Realty, the court noted
that Judge Friendly had not rejected an implied private right of
action for violation of all exchange or association rules, but rather
had rejected such actions only for those "catch-all" rules based
on vague adjurations of general forms of conduct.3 Relying heav-
ily on the Buttrey analysis, Judge Kerr termed Article III, section
1 of the NASD rules a "house-keeping" rule as opposed to a
specific rule creating a duty on the part of brokers to directly
protect investors from fraudulent conduct. 7 In the Geyer opinion,
note that the court erroneously adopted the Colonial Realty test based on its interpreta-
tion that the test would give rise to an implied private action only when fraud was proved.
Id. The court never discussed why the same was not true for the Buttrey test, especially
in view of its "tantamount to fraud" second element.
11 Id. at 96,715.
13 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975).
" Id. at 683.
" 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1969). The Texas court noted: "Colonial did
not issue a blanket holding that such dealer rules could never give rise to federal civil
liability."
' The court noted that in contrast to Art. III, § 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice,
the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules were "quite precise" and had
"among their purposes the protection of the investing public." 389 F. Supp. at 683. Art.
m, § 1, in contrast merely precluded conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable princi-
ples of trade." See note 18 supra.
" 389 F. Supp. at 683. The court stated that the Securities Acts, "although designed
to protect the investor, are essentially directed at fraud. In holding that the rules in
dispute are actionable, the Court does not mean to imply that mere negligence . . . will
suffice to sustain an action .... " Id.
1978
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the "Know Your Customer" and "Suitability" rules were found
to fall into the latter category.
In Thompson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., the Western District of Oklahoma held the "Know Your
Customer" rules to be nonactionable by a private investor."
Without any discussion in the opinion of the case law behind this
issue, Judge Eubanks granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment after plaintiff conceded the nonactionability of the rule
in question. 0
The most recent attempt by a court within the Tenth Circuit
to resolve the issue of whether violations of the NASD's
"Suitability" rule give rise to an implied private right of action
occurred in Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., a
Northern District of Oklahoma decision." Again without any dis-
cussion of the case law, Judge Cook simply noted that the plain-
tiff had failed to demonstrate even negligence on the part of the
broker-defendant, or that the broker's conduct was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's loss. The plaintiff's allegation that the defen-
dant had made an unsuitable investment was therefore denied.,
From this extremely weak intra-circuit district court line of
analysis, the Tenth Circuit attempted to resolve the lower court
split in Utah State University. Following is discussion of Judge
Breitenstein's analysis.
II. UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
A. Exchange and Association Rules
After recognizing the split existing in the Tenth Circuit as a
Geyer was cited with approval in Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp.
at 1041. The Geyer decision was criticized in Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414
F. Supp. at 890, where the court noted: "While the SEC's view of a broker-dealer's duty
to supervise his employees is certainly of some significance, adoption of a rule imposing
stringent standards of conduct does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that a federal
court ought to create the basis for a lawsuit in damages for breach of that rule."
401 F. Supp. 111, 112 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
, There is no indication in the opinion as to why the plaintiff conceded this highly
questionable issue. Thompson has only been cited twice since it was decided, but neither
subsequent case discussed the actionability of exchange rules. See Franke v. Midwestern
Okl. Development Authority, 428 F. Supp. 719, 723 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Vacca v. Intra
Mgmt. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
" 413 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
42 Id. at 384. The Marshak decision has not been cited in any subsequent decision.
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result of the decisions discussed above,' 3 Judge Breitenstein dis-
posed of the implied private right of action issue in summary
fashion:
In Ocrant .. by way of dicta, and citing Buttrey, we recognized
that "in an appropriate case, violations of exchange rules designed
for customer protection might give rise to a private cause of action
The statement in Ocrant is pertinent. In an appropriate case a
rule violation may give rise to a private cause of action.
Applying the statements of the Court to claims asserted under
association and exchange rules, something more than mistake or
negligence must be shown . . . .The allegations, taken separately
or together, are not Tantamount to fraud."
Without expressly so stating, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
Buttrey test in toto. 45 It is different to determine from reading the
opinion, however, whether the court felt compelled to include the
"tantamount to fraud" element in its analysis because of the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Buttrey, or the recent Supreme
Court decision of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder," or both.47
Two criticisms may be leveled at Judge Breitenstein's mode
of analysis. First, there is little guidance in Utah State
University, for distinguishing rules "designed for customer pro-
tection" from those rules aimed at accomplishing other purposes.
One could take the position that, all the rules of exchanges and
associations exhibit some degree of concern for the "protection of
'1 549 F.2d at 168.
44 Id.
,3 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
" 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
' The "tantamount to fraud" element has been a prominent aspect of many decisions
applying the Buttrey test. Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975). See, e.g.,
Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160. The Tenth Circuit, however, has
never cited this element as mandated by the Buttrey test. See notes 38, 31, and accompa-
nying text supra. See the discussion of Ocrant, text accompanying note 28 supra.
In contrast to the lack of any mention of Buttrey, Judge Breitenstein devoted exten-
sive space to Ernst & Ernst, citing the legislative history behind the Supreme Court's
position that conduct is actionable under section 10(b) only if fraudulent. 549 F.2d at 168.
This analogy is highly suspect, however, for Congress had no intentions regarding the
purpose and scope of rules promulgaed by an exchange or association. A counter argument
can even be made that to make only fraudulent conduct actionable under exchange and
association rules would be merely duplicative of section 10(b). See Zagari v. Dean Witter
& Co., 11976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,812; Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F.
Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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customers."'48 If this is so, the Tenth Circuit has made no attempt
to identify those factors which will help in determining the ac-
tionability of a specific rule.
Perhaps, this failure to identify such criteria is more a short-
coming of the Buttrey test, itself, than something peculiar to the
Tenth Circuit.'9 An example of the guidance that could have been
offered by the Utah State University decision may be found in
Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. w In that opinion
Judge Kerr attempted to distinguish "house-keeping rules," such
as the composition and election of the board of governors, trans-
fers of memberships, dues and other fees, registration of floor
employees, and back-office procedures, from those rules promul-
gated by organizations for the direct protection of customers from
fraudulent conduct.' Even the Geyer court's analysis is question-
able if one notes that the Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets of the Securities Exchange Commission found the
"Know Your Customer" rules to have been designed primarily to
protect member firms against irresponsible customers." Based on
4' See generally Allen, Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act For Violations of
Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. LAW. 1493, 1501 (1970); Wolfson and Russo, supra note
13, at 1130; Comment, Civil Liability For Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v. First Securi-
ties Co., 121 U. PA. L. REv. 388, 393 (1972).
11 In Buttrey, the Seventh Circuit did refer fleetingly to the trial court's discussion
of nonactionable housekeeping rules, but the circuit court failed to expand on this. 410
F.2d at 141. Other commentators have attempted to identify the element distinguishing
actionable from non-actionable exchange and association rules. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. at 1040-41 (rules must be sufficiently precise); Allen
supra note 48, at 1500; Hoblin, supra note 13, at 274-79; MacLean, supra note 13, at 76;
Wolfson and Russo, supra note 13, at 1135-1141; Comment, The "Know Your Customer"
Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities
Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489, 547-48.
" 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975). For a discussion of the facts of Geyer see text
accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
51 389 F. Supp. at 683. See also Allen, supra note 48, at 1500-01. Allen discusses the
various forms of "housekeeping rules," i.e., rules dealing with access and communication
with the trading floor (NYSE Rules 35-38); making and settling exchange contracts
(NYSE Rules 45-47); maintenance of market through bids and offers (NYSE Rules 61-
79); handling of orders and reports (NYSE Rules 115-126); and, comparison and exchange
of contracts (NYSE Rules 131-143).
52 See SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MASKERs OF THE SEcUmRTES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 316 (1963), where
it was noted:
In the study's public hearings, President Funston of the Exchange expressed
the opinion that the "know your customer rule" was primarily designed to
protect member firms against irresponsible customers, and the past applica-
VOL. 55
SECURITIES
this analysis, the "Know Your Customer" rules would, and
should, fail even the Buttrey test.
A second ground for criticism of the Utah State University
decision's adoption of the Buttrey test lies in the second element
of the test, i.e., whether the defendant's conduct had been
"tantamount to fraud."" Working from the basic premise that
the primary concern is whether a particular rule is designed for
customer protection, the court concluded that the defendant's
conduct was not tantamount to fraud, and the plaintiff could not
assert an implied private right of action. It is difficult to discern
from a reading of the opinion whether the court found that no
cause of action existed because the defendant's conduct was not
tantamount to fraud, or that a cause of action exists but fraud is
a necessary element to recovery.5' In either instance, the failure
to prove fraud will result in a denial of recovery by the plaintiff.
These two methods of analysis are quite distinct, however.
The Buttrey test makes the presence of fraud a prerequisite
to the recognition of an implied private right of action. Zagari v.
Dean Witter & Co., criticized such a position by noting:
It is one thing to say as the United States Supreme Court just
said in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder ... that while a private right
tion of the rule in exchange disciplinary proceedings confirms the view that
it has generally been restricted to such use.
See also, Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. at 419-20; Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-
1977] FED. SEac. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-14 n.10; Wolfson and Russo, supra note 13, at
1130.
53 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
See Hoblin, note 13 supra, at 267, where the author stated:
What is the relationship between a fraud concept and that of a rule
violation? No one disputes that a charge of fraud is actionable at common
law or under rule 10b-5; that was not the question before the court. With
respect to that count, fraud was irrelevant; either the violation of the rule
was actionable or it was not. The question of fraud should not have entered
into the court's consideration.
See also, Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. at 419:
The "tantamount to fraud" requirement makes the determination concern-
ing the private right of action depend upon individual conduct rather than
upon the nature of the rule in question, with the legally illogical result that
violation of the same rule would not consistently give rise to a cause of action.
See Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc ..... Courts have also expressed
concern that application of the Buttrey standard would cause excessive liti-
gation because a determination of the facts regarding fraud would be re-
quired before subject matter jurisdiction could be determined with certainty.
See Piper Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Landin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Lange
v. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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of action exists for violations of rule 10(b)-5, the rule itself is not
violated unless there is evidence of scienter, and an entirely different
thing to say as does the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey, that while rule
405 may be violated by simple errors of judgment, a private action
will only lie where the rule is violated by conduct "tantamount to
fraud.""
In contrast to the Buttrey form of analysis, however, the
court, by its numerous references to the Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder decision,5" may have implicitly adopted the position
that an implied private right of action lies for violation of an
exchange or association rule, and that fraud is a necessary ele-
ment thereof.57 This interpretation of the Utah State University
decision may help to account for the emphasis placed by the
Court on Ernst & Ernst, while totally ignoring the fact that
"tantamount to fraud" is also the second element of the Buttrey
test. While a close reading of the Utah State decision supports
this latter interpretation, clarification by the court in the future
would be of great assistance.
The third, and most important, ground for criticism of the
Tenth Circuit's decision was the court's failure to take cognizance
of the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in Cort
v. Ash.5 In Cort, the Court formulated a four-pronged test for
determining whether a statute gives rise to an implied private
right of action. The factors identified by the Court were: (1)
Whether plaintiff was a member of the class for whose benefit the
statute was passed; (2) whether Congress indicated an explicit or
implicit legislative intent to grant or deny such a remedy; (3)
whether an implied right of action is consistent with the legisla-
tive scheme; and, (4) whether the cause of action would be in an
area of law traditionally relegated to state law.59
In two very recent Supreme Court opinions decided subse-
[1976-19771 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-14 n.ll.
425 U.S. at 196. Justice Powell stated, "Although § 10(b) does not by its terms
create an express civil remedy . . . the existence of a private cause of action for violations
of the statute and the Rule is now well established." But cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (the Court stated it has only recognized an implied cause of action
under some circumstances).
11 425 U.S. at 196-97. Even the dissent in Ernst & Ernst did not view the majority's
opinion as doing anything more than defining an element of a section 10(b) cause of action.
Id. at 218.




quent to Utah State University by only two months, the Supreme
Court applied the Cort criteria to the implication of private ac-
tions under the federal securities laws. In Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., 10 the Court rejected an implied right of action for
defeated tender-offerors under section 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. In that instance, the Court found that the
tender-offeror-plaintiff failed to satisfy any of the four Cort ele-
ments." In a subsequent decision, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, the Court found that an alleged breach of corporate fidu-
ciary duty, absent an allegation of fraud or misrepresentation did
not violate section 10(b) . 2 Part four of the Green opinion contains
language similar to that found in the Utah State University deci-
sion, namely, that without proof of fraud, a breach of fiduciary
duty did not give rise to a private cause of action under section
10(b).13 Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in part, aptly noted that
part four was unnecessary to the decision, in light of the earlier
resolution of the case on the grounds that the facts alleged by the
plaintiff in his complaint did not constitute "fraud" within the
meaning of section 10(b). 4 The Green decision, therefore, is an
excellent example of the vagueness, overbreadth, and confusion
also demonstrated in Utah State University.
At the time of the Utah State University decision Judge
Peckham, in Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., had already recognized
that in comparing the Buttrey and Colonial Realty standards, it
was apparent that the former embodies only the first of the Cort
factors.6 5 In contrast, Colonial Realty implicitly encompassed the
first factor in Cort, and explicitly addressed the remaining
so 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
61 The Court examined each of the four elements of the Cort test, determining that:
(1) The Williams Act (§ 14(e)) was enacted solely to protect investors, not tender-offerors;
(2) there was no indication that Congress intended to create a private action for the loser
in a tender offer contest; (3) the Williams Act was designed as a disclosure mechanism
not a means for recovering monetary damages by a person outside the protection class;
and (4) the common law action of interference with commercial advantages was available.
Id. at 37-41. It is interesting to note that in coming to the opposite conclusion of the
majority, the dissent also based their argument on Cort v. Ash.
62 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" Id. at 477-80. This portion of the opinion was dictum, however, for the Court had
already dismissed the plaintiffs claim for failure to prove a necessaary element of the
cause of action: scienter. Id. at 474-77.
' Id. at 480-81.
0 [1976-19771 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,809.
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three. 6 In a decision subsequent to Utah State University, Nelson
v. Hench, the Minnesota District Court noted, "The appropriate-
ness of Judge Friendly's approach [Colonial Realty] was implic-
itly confirmed recently by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash
.... ,"67 Numerous other courts have also attempted to resolve
the implied private right of action for violation of exchange or
association rules by applying the Cort criteria.68
The analysis in Nelson v. Hench9 succinctly demonstrates
the result obtained from an application of the Cort test to the
"Know Your Customer" rule. Considering each element, the
court noted: (1) The rule "must have been enacted primarily for
the protection of the dealers . . . . [Pilaintiffs . . . cannot es-
tablish . . . that the protection of investors . . . was more than
an incidental motive for enactment of these rules."; (2)
"[Cilearly Congress did not contemplate causes of action arising
under rules promulgated by exchanges or dealer associations"; (3)
"Moreover, the implication of such rights of action is diametri-
cally opposite to the concept of self-regulation that is essential to
the regulatory scheme and purpose of the 1934 Act"; and, (4) "In
essence, the NYSE and NASD have incorporated into their rules
one standard by which defendant firms' duty could be measured
in a negligence action."70 The Zagari court paralleled this analy-
sis, and in addition, noted that section 10(b) was also an avail-
able, existing remedy.
7'
To apply the Cort test and recognize an implied private right
would require proof that under the "Know Your Customer" rule
the "protection of investors" was as important, if not more impor-
Mld.
428 F. Supp. at 419.
" Numerous other opinions have also recognized the applicability of the Cort test to
the issue of whether violations of exchange or association rules will give rise to a private
cause of action. See, e.g., Lank v. NYSE, 548 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1977) (Cort used in the
context of a suit by one exchange member against another); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegler
& Co., 534 F.2d 156, 166 (9th Cir. 1976) (pursuant to Cort a private action will lie against
an exchange for violation of the registration provisions); Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon
Auchincloas, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn. 1977) (applying Cort, violations of
margin requirements may give rise to an implied private right of action); Lange v. H.
Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (no implied private right of action
for violations of NASD Rules of Fair Trade).
U 428 F. Supp. 411 (D. Minn. 1977).
Id. at 419-20.




tant, than the protection of brokers; the potential for implied civil
liability was consistent with the regulatory scheme of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act; and, that despite a fraud requirement, the
"Know Your Customer" rules still preclude conduct not action-
able under presently existing theories. No plaintiff, within the
framework of the Cort test, has attempted this argument to date.
Whether the Tenth Circuit, therefore, implicitly rejected the
applicability of Cort to Utah State University, or the defendants
failed to raise the issue of the Cort test, is unimportant. Of greater
importance is the very questionability of the mode of analysis
relied upon by the court.
B. Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board72
A brief discussion of the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a
violation of regulation T (margin requirement) of the Federal
Reserve Board does not give rise to a private cause of action is
merited more because of the method of analysis used in that
portion of the opinion than because of the result reached.73 The
issue of whether violation of regulation T should give rise to a
private cause of action has been the subject of as much debate
as whether violation of exchange or association rules should give
rise to such a remedy. Again the federal courts have demon-
strated a clearly distinguishable split both in the results they
have reached and the analytical frameworks they have used.74
72 See note 9 supra.
" 549 F.2d at 169-70.
7, For an indication of the divergence in many circuits see generally Shull v. Dain,
Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1977); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251,
260, (4th Cir. 1975) (no cause of action created); McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620,
627 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975) (no right of action); Gordon v.
duPont, Glore Forgan Inc., 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974)
(no action under these circumstances); Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246, 247 (6th
Cir. 1973) (right of action allowed); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German Co., 429 F.2d 1136,
1142-44 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Junger v. Hertz, Neumark, &
Warner, 426 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970); Bronner v. Gold-
man, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933 (1966); Goldenberg v. Bache &
Co., 270 F.2d 675, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1959) (right of action allowed); Drasner v. Thomson,
McKinnon Securities, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no cause of action exists);
Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn. 1977)
(cause of action exists); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) at 90,813 (rejected existence of a cause of action); Freeman v. Marine Midland
Bank, 419 F. Supp. 440, 451-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussion of regulation T and regulation
X); Architectural League of N.Y. v. Bartas, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (no action absent
showing that broker induced investor to buy); Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., 392 F. Supp. 646,
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Judge Breitenstein's analysis of the regulation T issue was
markedly different from his analysis of the "Know Your Cus-
tomer" and "Suitability" rules. In examining the issue, the court
questioned whether the regulation was presently intended to pro-
tect investors,7 5 whether an implied private action was consistent
with the legislative scheme behind the regulation of margin re-
quirements,7" and whether criminal sanctions were available
against a violating broker." A closer examination of these con-
cerns reveals that they coincide almost exactly with elements one,
three, and four of the Cort v. Ash test.7" Judge Breitenstein also
noted that in 1970, after numerous cases had imposed civil liabil-
ity upon brokers for violation of margin requirements, Congress
amended section 7(f) of the Securities Exchange Act, making it
illegal for a customer to obtain or receive credit in violation of
Federal Reserve Board Regulations.7" Therefore, the second ele-
ment of Cort, whether Congress expressly or implicitly intended
to grant or deny an implied private right of action, was indirectly
addressed in Utah State University. Nowhere in the 1970 amend-
ments was implied civil liability ever mentioned. s0 As with the
exchange and association rules, the Zagaril' court applied the
Cort factors to its analysis of regulation T and arrived at the same
conclusion as Utah State University.
One can only wonder why the Tenth Circuit did not apply
the same analytical framework to exchange and association rules
as it applied to violations of regulation T. With this in mind,
therefore, it can certainly be argued that the issue of the existence
650-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (duty on brokers to ensure that customers understand).
See also, Comment, Civil Liability For Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f)
and Regulation X, 43 FORDHAM L. Rav. 93, 104-17 (1974); Note, Regulation X and
Investor-Lender Margin Violation Disputes, 57 MtNN. L. Ray. 208 (1972).
549 F.2d at 170. (The primary purpose was to promote market stability).
Id. (Broker is no longer the sole party responsible for observing margin require-
ments).
11 Id. (The court noted that, although the criminal penalty depended on who the
violator was, that was not grounds for imposing civil liability. As a second form of liability,
if fraud were involved, the conduct would be actionable under section 10(b). See, e.g.,
Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir. 1977); Zagari v. Dean
Witter & Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-3.
' See text accompanying notes 58 and 59 supra.
' This was done through the promulgation of Regulation X, 549 F.2d at 170. See also
note 9 supra.
0 See Note and Comment, note 74 supra.
" [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,813-3.
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of an implied private right of action for violation of exchange and
association rules has not totally been foreclosed by the accept-
ance of such in Utah State University.
CONCLUSION
The Utah State University decision reflects the Tenth Cir-
cuit's attempt to align itself more closely with the holdings of
various recent Supreme Court securities decisions, while demon-
strating a lack of understanding of the policy basis from which
the Supreme Court opinions arose.8" Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, when viewed from the perspective of the Supreme Court
decisions following it, appears to have been a logical step for
the Court in light of its earlier decisions, Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores and Cort v. Ash." The Utah State Univer-
sity decision reaches a result consistent with the recent position
of the Supreme Court without exploring the analytical under-
pinnings so carefully laid by the Supreme Court as justification
for its decisions. It is for that reason that although the decision
is seemingly correct in the result it reaches, the Tenth Circuit's
mode of analysis and the conclusions it draws therefrom are not
totally consistent. In conclusion, the Utah State University
decision represents the difficulties that the Tenth Circuit,
like many other circuit courts, is having in reconciling the rather
drastic reversal in the policy rationales being used by the
Supreme Court in recent securities litigation and the broad, re-
medial, and flexible approach to the securities acts that for so
long has been the touchstone of securities litigation in the federal
courts."4
John L. Ruppert
For a discussion of this recent reversal in the Supreme Court's attitude toward the
federal securities laws, see, Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977); Ruppert, The
Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: A New Securities Law Perspective,
3 J. CowP. L. 112 (1977). For a graphic demonstration of the shift, see Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Foremost-
McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" See Lowenfels note 82 supra. See also Ruppert note 82 supra.
U See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (interpret the
acts flexibly to effectuate their remedial purpose); Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (protection of
investors).

